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At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units 
around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. 
These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about 
real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), 
we examined people’s moral attitudes toward triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found 
elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not stem from 
period change in moral attitudes relative to pre-pandemic levels--but rather, from the heightened 
realism of triage dilemmas. Participants favored utilitarian resolutions of critical care dilemmas 
when compared to structurally analogous, non-medical dilemmas—and such support was rooted 
in prosocial dispositions, including empathy and impartial beneficence. Finally, despite abundant 
evidence of political polarization surrounding Covid-19, moral views about critical care triage 
differed modestly, if at all, between liberals and conservatives. Taken together, our findings 
highlight people’s robust support for utilitarian measures in the face of a global public health 
threat, and illustrate how hypothetical scenarios in moral psychology (e.g. trolley cases) should 
strive for more experiential and psychological realism, otherwise their results might not 
generalize to real-world moral dilemmas. 
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Trolleys, Triage and Covid-19: The Role of Psychological Realism in Sacrificial Dilemmas 
Early on in the Covid-19 pandemic, case rates and deaths saw exponential growth. Their 
trajectory surpassed numerous governments’ predictions, and quickly depleted medical resources 
at many intensive care units (ICUs) around the world. As a result, frontline medical professionals 
faced what some imagined would remain an outlandish philosophical thought experiment: the 
choice whether to sacrifice some patients in order to save a larger number of lives (Emanuel et 
al., 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic brought the infamous trolley problem (Foot, 1967) to life, 
and provided a unique opportunity for moral psychologists to explore how the public approaches 
such tragic dilemmas when contextualized in ecologically valid settings involving triage at the 
ICU. What should frontline doctors do when faced with the decision whether to sacrifice one 
patient to prioritize saving more lives? The purpose of our present work is to explore this exact 
question (see also Arora, Savulescu, Maslen, Selgelid & Wilkinson. 2016; Wilkinson, Zohny, 
Kappes, Sinnott-Armstrong, & Savulescu, 2020). 
Below, we first distill past findings drawn from the literature on hypothetical sacrificial 
dilemmas, and echo previous concerns about limits to their ecological validity—which our 
studies then partly substantiate. Additionally, we review distinct models according to which 
various contextual elements (e.g., personal susceptibility, period change) could modulate the 
public’s moral attitudes. Turning to our studies, we document pronounced utilitarian tendencies 
in triage contexts (Study 1), and test two distinct explanations for this effect in Studies 2 and 3: 
period change and psychological realism, respectively. In closing, we elaborate on the practical 
implications of these results for public health guidelines governing the allocation of critical care 
resources, and highlight their theoretical implications for traditional approaches to the study of 
moral cognition.  




Research in moral psychology relies heavily on “sacrificial dilemmas” (Bartels & 
Pizarro, 2011) in which impending harm to a larger group of people can be avoided by harming a 
smaller group instead. Among the most famous of these hypothetical scenarios are two versions 
of the trolley dilemma, in which a runaway trolley will kill five workmen unless something is 
done (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976, 1985). In the Bystander version,  the trolley can be diverted 
onto another track by operating a lever, where it would run over a single worker instead. In the 
Footbridge version, the trolley can be stopped before it reaches the workmen by pushing a heavy 
man off a footbridge and into the trolley’s path.  
Contrary to utilitarian moral principles, people report conflicting intuitions about these 
cases: choosing to save the larger number of lives in Bystander but not in Footbridge. Hundreds 
of empirical studies have now employed sacrificial dilemmas (for a review, see Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012) to characterize the psychological basis of this distinction (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001, 2009; Patil, 2015) 
and examine its generalizability across cultures (Awad et al., 2020) and birth cohorts 
(Hannikainen et al., 2018). This large empirical literature has also inspired sophisticated 
theoretical developments, from Greene and colleagues’ (2001, 2007) dual process theory, and 
Mikhail’s (2007, 2009) universal moral grammar to the two-dimensional model of utilitarianism 
advanced by Kahane, Everett and colleagues (Kahane et al., 2015 2018).   
Among the most recurring findings in this literature is the association between affective 
empathy and opposition to utilitarian sacrifice (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). For instance, 
deficits in empathy have been associated with stronger utilitarian tendencies (Patil & Silani, 
2014), which may help to explain why psychopathic individuals report more favorable attitudes 
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toward utilitarian sacrifice than do psychotypical controls (Koenigs et al., 2012). This line of 
research has inspired skepticism about the relationship between sacrificial dilemmas and 
utilitarian thought in moral philosophy (but see Conway et al., 2018). Namely, utilitarian 
reactions to hypothetical dilemmas may not reflect a concern for the greater good (Kahane et al., 
2015) but rather a reduced aversion to causing harm (Miller et al., 2014) that accompanies Dark 
Triad traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy; see Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; 
Patil, 2015).  
Experimental studies employing immersive methods to elevate affective engagement 
have provided further nuance. If affective empathy primarily constrains utilitarian sacrifice, then 
inducing greater engagement ought to elicit stronger affective reactions and further dampen 
utilitarian tendencies. Yet, efforts to make sacrificial dilemmas more vivid and life-like--e.g., 
through the use of virtual reality (Patil et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2016), haptic feedback (Francis 
et al., 2017), or the anticipation of actual harm to mice (Bostyn et al., 2018)--have all revealed 
evidence to the contrary. Immersive research methods in fact strengthen people’s utilitarian 
motivation, when compared to their responses to abstract narrations of those same dilemmas.  
These results cannot readily be explained when associating affective empathy in the 
opposition to harmful acts. According to the two-dimensional model of utilitarianism, utilitarian 
tendencies manifest in the general population as two distinct—and even unrelated—attitudes: 
approval of instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Reactions to sacrificial dilemmas are 
linked primarily to beliefs about the permissibility of instrumental harm (Kahane et al., 2015 
2018), while being largely unrelated to impartial beneficence. Could enhancing the ecological 
validity of moral dilemmas elevate utilitarian tendencies by promoting specifically beneficent 
motivations to act? Our studies pursue this hypothesis, which (if supported) could help reconcile 
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the well-known association between affective deficits and utilitarian sacrifice (in traditional, text-
based dilemmas) with evidence that more immersive experimental paradigms have the opposite 
effect: i.e., of strengthening utilitarian motivation. 
External Validity 
In an influential paper, Bauman and colleagues (2014) raised concerns regarding the 
external validity of research on sacrificial dilemmas—that is, the extent to which the findings 
generalize to other, real-world situations (Campbell, 1957). Drawn from analytic philosophy, the 
dilemmas tend to be “set in fanciful, sometimes absurd, contexts, and these artificial settings may 
affect the way people approach the situation and decide what to do” (Bauman et al., 2014, p. 
536). Among philosophers, such thought experiments are fruitfully employed to elicit intuitions 
within the philosophical community. However, since people are not acquainted with the 
discipline’s conventions and methods (Converse, 1964; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), they may 
approach these dilemmas with a very different motivation. 
The external validity of sacrificial dilemma stimuli may be compromised by three 
different factors (Aronson et al., 1998): First, they could fail to meaningfully engage the 
participant, for instance, if they are met with amusement (experimental realism). Second, they 
may be too dissimilar to the situations participants routinely encounter in their lives (mundane 
realism). Consequently, participants might question central premises (e.g., could the heavy man 
actually stop the trolley?), and be reluctant to accept the scenario (as seen, e.g., in Greene et al., 
2009). Third, the scenarios might also lack psychological realism—partly as a consequence of 
low experimental and mundane realism: They may not elicit the same cognitive processes that 
take place in real-world circumstances. Unrealistic scenarios might, for instance, fail to produce 
characteristic reactions such as outrage toward transgressors or avoidance of those who manifest 
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different moral values (for evidence that trolley dilemmas are wanting in this regard, see 
Baumann et al., 2012, Study 3). 
Sacrificial dilemmas related to the Covid-19 pandemic—henceforth triage or critical 
care dilemmas—may overcome some of these limitations (Buckwalter & Peterson, 2020; 
Wilkinson et al. 2020; Romero-Rivas et al., 2021; Reeskens et al. 2021; Francis & McNabb, 
2021; Antoniou et al., 2021). First, due to a shortage of supplies and staff, medical personnel at 
numerous intensive care units around the world—particularly during the first wave—faced 
actual sacrificial dilemmas. Second, the death toll due to coronavirus rose rapidly, and received 
continuous press coverage. Third, in addition to the health burden of the virus itself, the 
pandemic has also brought about changes in lifestyle, mental health, occupational status, and 
family life that have dramatically affected everyone. It stands to reason, then, that triage 
dilemmas have both experimental and mundane realism; they are real-life situations with which 
most participants are at least indirectly acquainted. Consequently, we suspected that their level of 
psychological realism would also be high. And indeed, transgressors of health and security 
measures tend to witness the full spectrum of reactions (e.g., outrage, contempt, disgust, see 
Rozin et al., 1999) known to accompany moral misbehavior. Disagreements over the correct 
political response to the pandemic as well as individual distancing measures have engendered 
heated debate, manifestations drawing large crowds, and destroyed many a relationship, as 
research on prejudice toward morally dissimilar others would predict (Skitka et al., 2005; Cole 
Wright et al., 2008).  
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Prevalence, Proximity and Period  
Susceptibility to severe coronavirus infection varies across time and locations (i.e., with 
fluctuation in contagion and case rates) and also across individuals (i.e., depending on health 
factors). This variation provided two distinct tests of the psychological realism hypothesis.  
When we ran the first wave of studies, in mid-April 2020, the bulk of infections and 
deaths were limited to a handful of US states, including New York, Pennsylvania and Michigan. 
Most other states had extremely low infection rates, many vacant hospital beds, and barely any 
coronavirus-related deaths. Thus, in New York City, which was seeing hundreds of daily deaths 
and where hospitals were at maximum occupancy, a triage dilemma would plausibly have been 
much more realistic than in Wyoming, which at the time had a total of 296 confirmed cases, 
plenty of hospital bed availability, and only two coronavirus-related deaths (New York Times, 
2020). We hypothesized that regional variation in Covid-19 prevalence could affect 
psychological realism, and therefore operationalized county-level case rates as a first realism 
proxy.  
Another feature that may affect the realism of triage dilemmas is participants’ individual 
susceptibility to Covid-19 hospitalization and death. An elderly, at-risk person concerned with 
their own risk of developing severe symptomatology, or an essential worker witnessing multiple 
coronavirus-related deaths every day as part of their profession might view triage dilemmas in a 
more realistic light than average. To evaluate this feature, which we labeled proximity, several 
items in our survey assessed the degree to which people were personally affected by the 
pandemic.  
Thus, whereas prevalence constituted an objective measure of participants’ exposure to 
Covid-19 (in virtue of their geographic location), proximity was a self-reported measure of 
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participants’ subjective affectedness (owing to factors such as occupational hazard, health status, 
and so on).  
Finally, we also explored whether the pandemic induced a general change in people’s 
utilitarian inclinations. To examine this question, we compared participants’ judgments of 
traditional sacrificial dilemmas during the pandemic (in May 2020) to a dataset collected one yea 
prior. A potential period effect in responses, however, must be interpreted with caution. Given 
that, at the height of the pandemic, triage dilemmas received ample attention in mainstream 
media, and were at times discussed in conjunction with classic philosophical thought 
experiments (e.g., The Atlantic, 2020), a period effect could also indicate a perceived increase in 
realism and relevance of traditional dilemmas. 
Overview 
Our studies were conducted with approval from the Ethics Commission of the University 
of Zurich. We first report attitudes toward a series of critical care dilemmas across high and low 
prevalence states (Study 1). Then, in Studies 2 and 3, we pursue two potential explanations for 
the emergence of heightened utilitarian tendencies in response to triage dilemmas involving 
coronavirus patients: a period effect (Study 2) and a realism effect (Study 3). After reporting on 
the three studies, we turn to individual difference analyses which help to elucidate variation in 
response to triage versus traditional dilemmas.  
Data and materials are available on the Open Science Framework at 
osf.io/dpsq9/?view_only=54a7c150e03d4d78819b2954cee3a240. We disclose all measures, 
manipulations, and exclusions in the studies. Participants were adults residing in the United 
States recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com). To maximize data quality, we 
screened out participants who failed a two-part attention check at the start of the experiment. 
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This attention check resulted in 453 exclusions in Study 1 (33% exclusion rate), 149 exclusions 
in Study 2 (14% exclusion rate), and 78 exclusions in Study 3 (14% exclusion rate). The method 
by which we determined the sample size for each study is reported in the corresponding ‘Power 
Analysis’ subsections. 
Frequentist and Bayesian analyses were conducted using R version 3.6.2 and the car (Fox 
& Weisberg, 2019) and BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2018) packages. Pairwise comparisons 
of simple and marginal effects were calculated with the emmeans (Lenth, 2019) package, 
applying Tukey correction for multiple comparisons (notated as pTukey throughout the Results 
sections).  
Study 1 
In Study 1, we surveyed participants’ attitudes toward critical care triage at the height of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. The core questions in Study 1 were: Do people typically favor or oppose 
utilitarian standards in ICU triage? Do such attitudes toward ICU triage depend upon the 
magnitude of the Covid-19 threat? To answer our second question, we evaluated the effects of 
geographic variation in the health burden of Covid-19 (as measured by daily, county-level 
updates of case and mortality rates) by sampling from high and low prevalence regions of the 
United States, and also the effects of subjective beliefs about the virus’s severity. 
Methods 
Materials 
For Study 1, we devised three different critical care dilemmas: Redirect, Withdraw, and 
Jeopardize. Each dilemma involves the sacrifice of a human life in order to save a larger number 
of lives. In Redirect, an oxygen tank is on its way to a hospital where a single coronavirus patient 
requires urgent treatment. The decision must be made whether to redirect the oxygen tank to a 
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second ICU nearby where five, similarly critical, coronavirus patients recently checked in. 
Meanwhile, in Withdraw, an oxygen tank is already in use to treat a single coronavirus patient at 
a hospital ICU. This time, the decision must be made whether to disconnect the oxygen tank and 
drive it to a second ICU to save five coronavirus patients. Thus, the Redirect/Withdraw pair 
serves as a test of the so-called ‘equivalence thesis’: i.e., the notion that withholding and 
withdrawing treatment are equivalent from a moral point of view (Sulmasy & Sugarman, 1994). 
Finally, in Jeopardize, a frail essential worker can be sent to pick up an oxygen tank and drive it 
to an ICU where five coronavirus patients have just checked in. However, in doing so, the 
essential worker would likely contract coronavirus and die.  
In every scenario, we stipulated that—with near-certainty—the patients would survive if 
they received supplementary oxygen, and would die otherwise. We also stated that the patients 
could not be transported (due to their critical condition), that a decision had to be made 





 and April 21
st
 2020, we recruited 906 crowdworkers (53% women; 
age: M = 38.9, SD = 13.0, range = 18 to 75). To maximize the ability to detect effects of 
prevalence, we recruited participants from five higher prevalence states (> 10 confirmed cases 
per 10,000 residents; Florida, Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania), and four lower 
prevalence states (< 10 confirmed cases per 10,000 residents; Arizona, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and Texas). Since transmission rates and Covid-19 prevalence were highest in densely 
populated areas (i.e. metropolitan areas), and these areas also tend to be more Democratic 
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(Wilkinson, 2019), we sought to balance the voting trends of high and low prevalence groups of 
states (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
By-State Sample Sizes, Covid-19 Statistics and Voting Trends 







New York 122 114 6.3 52:29 
Florida 85 48.5 2.5 42:39 
Michigan 105 29.2 2.1 45:38 
Pennsylvania 106 22.1 0.7 46:41 
Georgia 98 14.7 0.6 42:40 
Low 
Kentucky 68 6.0 0.3 41:45 
Texas 69 5.8 0.1 38:41 
Arizona 76 5.8 0.2 40:42 
North Carolina 168 5.2 0.1 44:39 
Note. Cases and death rates are per 10000 residents on April 17
th
 2020 (the first day of data 
collection). 
1
: compiled from the New York Times (2020) GitHub repository. 
2
: Gallup (2017) 
poll data. 
Procedure 
In a 3 × 1 between-subjects design, participants were asked to consider one of three 
critical care dilemmas: Withdraw, Redirect, Driver.  Participants were asked to rate the triage 
decision through five assessments: 
1) Prescription: whether the agent (1) “should” or (0) “should not” perform the 
utilitarian action. 
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2) Permissibility: whether it is morally permissible for the agent to: 
a) do nothing: 1  = “Yes”; 0 = “No”, 
b) perform the utilitarian action: 1  = “Yes”; 0 = “No”. 
In our studies, we compute the normalized average of both dichotomous items after 
reverse scoring the first item (i.e., relative permissibility: 0 = Only Inaction 
Permissible, 0.5 = Both/Neither Permissible, 1 = Only Action Permissible). 
3) Blameworthiness: whether it is morally blameworthy for the agent to: 
a) do nothing: 1  = “Not at all”; 7 = “Very much”, 
b) perform the utilitarian action:   = “Not at all”; 7 = “Very much”. 
We compute the difference score, blame for action – blame for inaction, (i.e., relative 
blame, ranging from -6: most utilitarian, 0: equal blame, to 6: most deontological).  
Following the triage dilemmas, participants completed a battery of individual difference 
measures. The results of these individual difference analyses are reported in Section 5. 
Secondary Data 
To devise a measure of local prevalence of Covid-19, we divide the recorded number of 
cases and deaths in each US county by its estimated population. County-level cases and deaths 
were obtained from the New York Times GitHub repository (github.com/nytimes/covid-19-
data), and population estimates were obtained from the US Census Bureau’s Population 
Estimates Program (www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest.html).  
Power Analysis 
 We set α to .05, and power to .80, in order to conduct a sensitivity power analysis for 
logistic regression. Assuming a baseline probability of .6 (  x = 0 = .6), a sample size of 906 
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participants provided sufficient statistical power to detect effects with an odds ratio (OR) ≥ 1.21 





test revealed that prescriptive judgments differed by scenario, χ
2
(2, 903) = 74.73, p < 
.001, Cramer's V = .27, 95% CI [.20, .34]. Participants were more likely to save five patients by 
redirecting the oxygen tank (   = .87, 95% CI [.83, .91]) than by disconnecting the oxygen tank (   
= .60, 95% CI [.55, .66]), OR = 4.46, φ = .31, z = 7.24, or fatally infecting an essential worker (   
= .62, 95% CI [.56, .67]), OR = 4.10, φ = .29, z = 7.00, both psTukey < .001 (see Figure 1). Still, it 
is noteworthy that, by comparison to the uniform distribution, participants tended to favor even 
instrumental sacrifice—whether of a patient (in Withdraw) or an essential worker (in Jeopardize) 
in order to save a larger number of lives. 
Permissibility and blame judgments also differed by scenario, permissibility: χ
2
(2, 903) = 
24.59, Cramer's V = .16, 95% CI [.11, .20]; blame: F(2, 902) = 35.77, ηp
2
 = .08, both ps < .001. 
Redirecting an oxygen tank was viewed as more permissible (   = .69, 95% CI [.64, .74]) than 
disconnecting an oxygen tank (   = .55, 95% CI [.49, .60]), rpb = .21, 95% CI [.13, .28], z = 3.69, 
or placing an essential worker at risk (   = .51, 95% CI [.64, .74]), rpb = .25, 95% CI [.17, .32], z 
= 4.65, both psTukey < .001. Redirecting an oxygen tank was also judged less blameworthy (ŷ = -
0.68, 95% CI [-0.95, -0.40]) than either disconnecting an oxygen tank (ŷ = 0.45, 95% CI [0.16, 
0.74]), Cohen's d = -0.48, 95% CI [-0.64, -0.31], t = -5.49, or infecting an essential worker (ŷ = 
0.97, 95% CI [0.70, 1.25]), Cohen's d = -0.67, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.51], t = -8.28, both psTukey < 
.001.  




County-level daily cases predicted participants’ self-reported exposure to Covid-19, OR 
= 1.85, 95% CI [1.10, 3.10], z = 2.33, p = .020. Participants who reported having had a close 
friend or family member hospitalized due to Covid-19 were more likely to reside in counties 
with more Covid-19 cases—serving as validation of our prevalence assessments.  
However, in multiple regression models, county-level Covid-19 prevalence had no effect 
on people’s moral attitude toward critical care dilemmas (prevalence: all χ
2
s < 1.40, all ps > .25; 
prevalence×scenario: all χ
2
s < 3.50, all ps > .15). Since prevalence is greater in population-dense 
areas, and greater population density is associated with a Democratic political orientation, we re-
ran the previous analyses entering participants’ reported voting intentions. These supplementary 
analyses revealed qualitatively similar results: Prevalence of Covid-19 did not influence moral 
attitudes on any dependent measure (prevalence: all χ
2
s < 1.70, all ps > .15; prevalence×scenario: 
all χ
2
s < 3.05, all ps > .20). Figure 1 displays prescriptive judgments by scenario and voting 
intention, separately for low- and high- prevalence states. 
Covid-19 Threat Severity 
We included a two-item measure of Covid-19 severity beliefs (Cronbach’s α = .73)—
described in further detail in the ‘Individual Difference Analyses section. This measure revealed 
a weak effect of perceived severity on moral attitudes toward critical care dilemmas: In a 
multiple logistic and linear regressions, viewing Covid-19 as a severe threat was associated with 
support for utilitarian triage decisions (OR = 1.14, z = 2.00, p = .045), and with judging that 
utilitarian action in triage contexts is more permissible (OR = 1.18, t = 2.18, p = .030) and 
marginally less blameworthy (B = -0.12, t = -1.69, p = .073, ηp
2
 = .003) than inaction.  
Figure 1  
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Prescriptive Judgments in Triage Dilemmas by Prevalence and Voting Intention 
 
Discussion 
Participants reported relatively favorable attitudes toward utilitarian resolutions of critical 
care dilemmas (see also Wilkinson et al., 2020). The clearest pattern emerged for collateral 
sacrifice (i.e., in the Redirect scenario): Participants prescribed utilitarian action, and judged it 
relatively more permissible and less blameworthy than inaction. For instrumental sacrifice, 
participants continued to prescribe utilitarian action (in the Withdraw and Jeopardize scenarios), 
despite rating it somewhat more blameworthy than inaction (and comparably permissible). These 
attitudes were unrelated to local prevalence of Covid-19, though they appeared to be weakly 
associated with beliefs about coronavirus severity. 




The observation of broad support for utilitarian interventions in Study 1 raises the 
possibility that the Covid-19 pandemic has precipitated a shift in people’s moral attitudes 
regarding human life. In Study 2, we examine whether the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic 
increased support for utilitarian sacrifice more broadly. To evaluate this hypothesis, we ran a 
two-wave longitudinal study contrasting people’s views about utilitarian sacrifice prior to versus 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Methods 
Materials 
In Study 2, we drew on a diverse set of traditional moral dilemmas, adapted from 
previous studies in moral psychology (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007). Four scenarios involved 
instrumental sacrifice (i.e., death as a means to the greater good; as in Withdraw), and four 
scenarios involved collateral sacrifice (i.e., death as a side effect of pursuing the greater good; as 
in Redirect). Importantly, none of the dilemmas employed in Study 2 alluded to the Covid-19 
pandemic, or described critical care scenarios.  
Participants 
905 crowdworkers (48% women; age: M = 40.5, SD = 13.6, range = 18 to 81) were 
recruited at two time points one year apart: May of 2019 (pre-pandemic n = 395), and May of 
2020 (mid-pandemic n = 513). 
Procedure 
In a 2 (period: pre, mid) × 2 (condition: instrumental, collateral) between-subjects design, 
participants were asked to consider a traditional moral dilemma involving either instrumental or 
collateral sacrifice. They then made prescriptive and permissibility judgments (but not 
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blameworthiness judgments), as in Study 1. Following the moral dilemma, participants 
completed a battery of individual difference measures—the results of which are reported in the 
Section titled ‘Individual Difference Analyses’. 
Power Analysis 
 We set α to .05, and β to .20 (power to 80%), in order to conduct a sensitivity power 
analysis for logistic regression. A sample size of 905 participants (and assuming   pre = .60) 
provided sufficient statistical power to detect effects with an odds ratio (OR) ≥ 1.21 (and ORs ≤ 
0.83). 
Results 
We entered period, condition and the two-way interaction between period and condition 
in mixed-effects regression models (with scenario as a random effect). Through model selection, 
we observed no main effect of period either on prescriptive judgments, χ
2
(df = 1) = 0.00, p = .97, 
or on permissibility judgments, F(1, 896) = 0.22, p = .73. In other words, the marginal effects of 
period on prescriptive judgments (  pre = .62, 95% CI [.48, .75]; vs.   mid = .63, 95% CI [.49, .75]), 
OR = 1.02, z = 0.11, p = .91, and permissibility judgments (ŷpre = -0.16, 95% CI [-1.20, 0.87]; vs. 
ŷmid = -0.10, 95% CI [-1.13, 0.93]), B = 0.06, z = 0.06, p = .95, were non-significant. 
Furthermore, a Bayesian analysis provided strong evidence for the absence of period effects 
(prescriptive: BF01 = 13.84; permissibility: BF01 = 12.92). 
We also found no period×condition interaction effect on relative permissibility 
judgments, F(1, 896) = 0.72, p = .63—though we observed a marginally significant trend for 
prescriptive judgments, χ
2
(df = 1) = 2.95, OR = 1.67, p = .086 (see Figure 2). The simple effects 
of period on prescriptive judgments were statistically non-significant (collateral: OR = 0.76, z = 
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-1.27, pTukey = .20; instrumental:  OR = 1.27, z = 1.19, pTukey = .23), and absent from a Bayesian 
perspective (collateral: BF01 = 9.54; instrumental: BF01 = 8.95). 
Propensity Score Matching 
Stay-at-home orders, and shifts in childcare duties and employment status, could have 
brought about changes in crowdworkers’ demographic profile from May 2019 to May 2020. To 
evaluate this concern, we first estimate propensity scores (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) for each 
participant: i.e., the predicted probability of participating in the study during the pandemic rather 
than before. Indeed, a multiple logistic regression (with age, gender, educational attainment and 
native language status) revealed significant differences in the demographic profile of our two 
samples, omnibus χ²(df = 4) = 17.86, p = .001. Specifically, whereas age (OR = 1.01, z = 1.67, p 
= .095), gender (OR = 0.83, z = -1.35, p = .18), and native language (OR = 0.59, z = -1.16, p = 
.25) differences were small and non-significant, educational attainment was a clear predictor of 
participation during the pandemic (vs. before), OR = 1.18, z = 3.36, p = .001.  
A nearest-neighbor matching algorithm yielded 395 matched pairs, which showed good 
balance on all four covariates: age (OR = 1.00, z = 0.54, p = .59), gender (OR = 1.07, z = 0.44, p 
= .66), native language (OR = 1.25, z = 0.40, p = .69), and educational attainment (OR = 1.05, z 
= 0.97, p = .33). In this matched dataset, the main effect of period remained non-significant 
(prescription: χ
2
[df = 1] = 0.00, OR = 1.00, p = .99, BF01 = 11.05; permissibility: F[1, 781] = 
0.21, p = .64, BF01 = 12.36), as did its interaction with condition (prescription: χ
2
[df = 1] = 1.98, 
OR = 1.55, p = .16, BF01 = 3.31; permissibility: F[1, 781] = 0.51, p = .47, BF01 = 7.31).  
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic has not affected moral 
attitudes toward utilitarian sacrifice in general (see also Francis, & McNabb, 2021). Therefore, 
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elevated utilitarian tendencies in Study 1 cannot straightforwardly be attributed to a period effect. 
Next, we turn to the realism hypothesis.  
Study 3 
To investigate the realism hypothesis, we conducted a third study during the Covid-19 
pandemic. According to this hypothesis, the psychological salience of Covid-19 could shift 
moral attitudes toward scenarios describing triage of coronavirus patients. Specifically, 
psychological realism may render triage dilemmas more engaging than hypothetical dilemmas 
and, as a result, elicit different cognitive processes (see also Francis et al., 2016 2017; Patil et al., 
2014). Such a result would imply certain limits on the ecological validity of traditional moral 
dilemma research (Baumann et al. 2014). 
Methods 
Materials 
For this study, we devised matched pairs of vignettes involving either instrumental or 
collateral sacrifice. In each pair, one vignette (taken from Study 1: i.e., Redirect or Withdraw) 
involved triage of critical care resources to treat Covid-19 patients, and another involved a 
tightly-matched, control dilemma about a house fire. More specifically, in the Collateral 
condition, a fire truck is rerouted from one smaller house fire to a larger house fire to save a 
larger number of lives. In the Instrumental condition, a fire truck ceases to extinguish a smaller 
house fire in order to save a larger number of lives in a larger, nearby fire. 
Participants 
A minimum sample size of 400 (or 100 per group) was decided before any data collection 
or analysis. 487 crowdworkers (44% women; age: M = 43.5, SD = 14.3, range = 21 to 79) were 
recruited in May of 2020. 




In a 2 within- (realism: triage, control) × 2 between- (condition: personal, impersonal) × 
2 between- (order: triage-first, control-first) subjects design, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four groups. In every group, participants viewed both a triage and a control 
(i.e., house fire) dilemma, and we manipulated the order in which the dilemmas appeared, as well 
as whether they involved instrumental or collateral sacrifice of a human life.  
 Power Analysis 
 We set α to .05, and β to .20 (power to 80%), in order to conduct a sensitivity power 
analysis for logistic regression. A sample size of 487 participants (and setting   control = .60) 




In a logistic regression model, we entered realism, condition and the two-way interaction 
between realism and condition as predictors of prescriptive judgments. A model comparison 
revealed effects of condition, χ
2
(df = 1) = 15.74, OR = 2.19, z = 3.92, and of the 
realism×condition interaction, χ
2
(df = 1) = 16.92, OR = 5.49, z = 4.00, both ps < .001. No main 
effect of realism was observed, χ
2
(df = 1) = 2.22, OR = 1.34, z = 1.48, p = .14.  
Figure 2 displays the simple effects in the realism×condition interaction: Participants in 
the Redirect condition were more likely to prescribe utilitarian action in a triage context (     .87, 
95% CI [.80, .92]) than in a control context (     .65, 95% CI [.57, .73]), OR = 3.64, z = 3.88, 
pTukey < .001—which corresponds to decisive evidence in Bayesian terms (BF10 = 371.53). The 
difference in the Withdraw condition was not statistically significant (  triage = .53, 95% CI [.44, 
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.63]; vs.   control = .64, 95% CI [.55, .71]), OR = 0.63, t = -1.55, pTukey = .12—which constitutes 
only anecdotal evidence in favor of the null (BF01 = 2.25).  
This pattern of results was mirrored in the ratings of blame: A two-way ANOVA 
revealed effects of condition, F(1, 479) = 9.49, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .02, realism, F(1, 479) = 4.44, p = 
.036, ηp
2
 = .01, and of the realism×condition interaction, F(1, 479) = 17.78, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .05. 
Participants in the Redirect condition assigned less blame for utilitarian action in a triage context 
(-1.03, 95% CI [-1.41, -0.65]) than in a control context (0.17, 95% CI [-0-19, 0.54]), t = 4.46, 
pTukey < .001, Cohen’s d = -0.64, 95% CI [-0.91, -0.38]. The difference in the Withdraw 
condition was not statistically significant (triage: 0.42, 95% CI [0.02, 0.81; vs. control: 0.00, 
95% CI [-0.37, 0.37]), t = -1.53, pTukey = .13, Cohen’s d = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.44]. 
Relative permissibility judgments revealed a different pattern: We observed more modest 
effects of condition, χ
2
(df = 1) = 5.41, OR = 1.08, p = .020, and of the realism×condition 
interaction, χ
2
(df = 1) = 7.18, OR = 1.16, p = .007. No main effect of realism was observed, χ
2
(df 
= 1) = 0.24, OR = 1.02, p = .62. This time, utilitarian action resulting in collateral death was not 
judged more permissible in a triage context (     .66, 95% CI [.60, .73]) than in a control context 
(     .60, 95% CI [.54, .66]), t = 1.53, pTukey = .13, rpb = .10, 95% CI [-.02, .22]. However, 
utilitarian action in the Instrumental condition was deemed less permissible in a triage context 
(.50, 95% CI [.44, .57]) than in a control context (.60, 95% CI [.55, .66]), t = -2.26, pTukey = .024, 
rpb = -.10, 95% CI [-.22, -.03]. 
Figure 2  
Prescriptive Judgments in Studies 1, 2 and 3. Heightened Endorsement of Collateral Sacrifice 
(Left) is Explained by an Effect of Realism (Right), not of Period (Center) 





Through model comparison, we observed a two-way interaction between condition and 
order for every dependent measure (prescription: χ
2
[df = 1] = 13.20, OR = 3.88, p < .001; 
permissibility: χ
2
[df = 1] = 4.49, OR = 1.95, p = .034; blame: F(1, 480) = 14.84, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.03). At a broad level, judgments of Collateral sacrifice depended on the order in which the 
dilemmas were presented (see Figure 3): When the triage dilemma was presented first, 
participants were more likely to report that agents should perform the utilitarian action across 
contexts (triage: z = 3.65, OR = 12.23, pTukey < .001; control: z = 2.79, OR = 5.64, pTukey = .005), 
that inaction was blameworthy in both contexts (triage: t = -3.20, Cohen's d = -0.45, 95% CI [-
0.71, -0.20], pTukey = .001; control: t = -4.61, Cohen's d = -0.65, 95% CI [-0.95, -0.39], pTukey < 
.001), and that utilitarian action in triage contexts was permissible (triage: z = 2.48, OR = 1.96, 
pTukey = .013; whereas control: z =1.27, OR = 1.29, pTukey = .21). 
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Figure 3  
Order Effects in Study 3. Marginal Effect of Triage-First Order by Condition. 
 
Note. *: The signs of the relative blame effects have been reversed in this figure. A positive effect 
indicates heightened utilitarianism in every panel. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 suggested that heightened utilitarianism in Study 1 (also observed 
in Wilkinson et al., 2020) may have arisen from the psychological realism of ICU triage 
dilemmas amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. Participants demonstrated more utilitarian attitudes 
when judging dilemmas involving critical care triage than when considering structurally 
analogous, control dilemmas—at least in circumstances demanding collateral sacrifice. This 
effect then shaped participants’ moral attitudes in the subsequent trial, resulting in elevated 
utilitarian attitudes toward control dilemmas when these were preceded by psychologically 
realistic, triage dilemmas. In sum, we obtained evidence for the absence of a period effect in 
Study 2 (through Bayesian analyses), but evidence in favor of a realism effect in Study 3. 
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Individual Difference Analyses 
Attitudes towards the Covid-19 pandemic have been shown to vary considerably with 
political ideology. Survey evidence reveals significant differences across party lines on 
numerous measures: the belief that “powerful people intentionally planned the Covid-19 
outbreak” (Republican: 34% v. Democrats 18%, Pew Research, 2020a), and that Covid-19 
constitutes a major public health threat (Republicans: 46% v. Democrats: 85%, Pew Research, 
2020c), as well as the fear of unwittingly spreading the virus (Republicans: 45% v. Democrats: 
77%) or contracting it (Republicans: 35% v. Democrats: 64%; Pew Research, 2020b). 
Given the pronounced differences in partisan views about the severity and origin of 
Covid-19, as well as in compliance with public health recommendations (Gollwitzer et al., 
2020), one might also expect disagreement between liberals and conservatives concerning 
critical care triage. In our studies, we sought to replicate evidence of political polarization 
concerning the origin and severity of Covid-19, and to ask whether polarization extends to the 
ethics of critical care triage (Hunter, 1991).    
Additionally, to deepen our understanding of the role of experimental realism in moral 
affect, we administered individual difference measures of empathy (Davis, 1983) and utilitarian 
motivation (Kahane et al., 2018). Here we report aggregate analyses examining their associations 
with moral attitudes toward triage dilemmas. 
Measures 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
Participants in Studies 1, 2 and 3 completed the empathic concern (Cronbach’s αs = .87, 
.87, .86) and perspective-taking (Cronbach’s αs = .83, .86, .84) subscales of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). Scores on the empathic concern subscale have been previously 
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associated with weaker utilitarian tendencies on hypothetical moral dilemmas (Gleichgerrcht & 
Young, 2013; also Hannikainen et al., 2018). 
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale 
Participants in Studies 1, 2 and 3 completed the nine-item Oxford Utilitarianism Scale  
(Kahane et al., 2018), composed of two subscales: instrumental harm  (Cronbach’s αs = .77, .81, 
.77) and impartial beneficence  (Cronbach’s αs = .76, .81, .79). Support for utilitarian trade-offs 
in hypothetical moral dilemmas has been associated primarily with scores on the instrumental 
harm subscale (Kahane et al., 2018). 
Social and Economic Conservatism Scale 
Participants in Studies 1 and 3 completed the twelve-item Social and Economic 
Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013; Cronbach’s αs = .87, .88). Participants reported their feelings 
toward twelve sociomoral issues that distinguish liberal from conservative ideology (e.g., 
patriotism, religion, welfare benefits [reversed], or gun ownership), on a scale anchored at 1: 
‘Negative’ to 7: ‘Positive’. 
Coronavirus Threat Severity 
To assess participants’ beliefs about the severity of coronavirus, participants were asked 
to answer two questions in Studies 1 and 3 (Cronbach’s αs = .73, .81): (1) “What is your general 
attitude towards the current coronavirus situation?”, ranging from 1: ‘People are completely 
exaggerating the danger’ to 7: ‘This is a very serious situation’; (2) “Do you think a lockdown as 
it is carried out in many countries is warranted?”, ranging from 1: ‘No, I completely disagree 
with the lockdown’ to 7: ‘Yes, I completely agree with the lockdown’. 
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Coronavirus Conspiracy Beliefs 
We also introduced a novel five-item assessment of conspiratorial thinking about 
coronavirus (Cronbach’s αs = .93, .93), adapted from the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale 
(Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). For each item (e.g., “The spread of coronavirus has 
been the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some governments and scientists”), 
participants reported their level of agreement from 1: ‘Strongly disagree’ to 7: ‘Strongly agree’.  
Power Analyses 
 We set α to .05, and β to .20 (power to 80%), in order to conduct sensitivity power 
analyses for pairwise correlation.  
Traditional Dilemmas. 509 participants (in Study 2 mid-pandemic wave) judged a 
traditional dilemma and completed the individual difference measures. This sample provided 
sufficient statistical power (80%, with α = .05) to detect correlations of |r| ≥ .12. 
Triage Dilemmas. 1132 participants judged a triage dilemma (as first trial; in Studies 1 
and 3) and completed the individual difference measures. This sample provided enough 
statistical power (80%, with α = .05) to detect correlations of |r| ≥ .08.  
Results 
Empathy in Triage versus Traditional Dilemmas 
We partially reproduced an association between empathic concern and deontological 
judgment (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013) in the context of standard hypothetical dilemmas: 
Greater empathic concern predicted reduced permissibility of utilitarian action (relative to 
inaction), r(509) = -.09, 95% CI [-.18, -.01], p  = .034. No corresponding effect emerged for 
prescriptive judgments or with the perspective-taking subscale (see Table 1).  
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In triage dilemmas, we also found an association between empathic concern and 
permissibility judgments—though in the opposite direction, r(1132) = .09, 95% CI [.03, .14], p  
= .003 (see Table 2). In other words, empathic individuals were more likely to view utilitarian 
triage as permissible, but utilitarian action in hypothetical dilemmas as impermissible. 
Furthermore, the effect of empathic concern on permissibility judgments was moderated 
by type of dilemma (empathic concern×dilemma type: χ
2
[df = 1] = 12.28, OR = 1.89, p = .001). 
Partialing out the effect of scenario in a multiple regression, confirmed that the marginal slope of 
empathic concern in traditional dilemmas was negative (as in prior research; OR = 0.66, partial r 
= -.12) but positive in triage dilemmas (OR = 1.25, partial r = .06)—and these effects 
significantly differed, z = 3.52, p < .001. Still, generally speaking, the role of self-reported affect 
appeared to be fickle in our studies. 
Table 2 
Pairwise Correlation Between IRI Subscales and Moral Judgments in Traditional (Above 
Diagonal) and Triage (Below Diagonal) Dilemmas 
Ns = 1132 (below); 509 (above). (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Note. *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .005. Bold cells indicate significant correlations between 
IRI subscales and moral attitudes. 
Utilitarian Beliefs in Triage versus Traditional Dilemmas 
Both facets of utilitarianism correlated with judgments of both triage and hypothetical 
dilemmas (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
Pairwise Correlation Between OUS Subscales and Moral Judgments in Traditional (Above 
Diagonal) and Triage (Below Diagonal) Dilemmas 
Ns = 1132 (below); 509 (above). (1) (2) (3) (4) 








































Note. *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .005. Bold cells indicate significant correlations between 
OUS subscales and moral attitudes. 
A series of regression models uncovered significant differences in the role of utilitarian 
beliefs across dilemma types: First, instrumental harm and impartial beneficence differentially 
predicted prescriptive judgments across dilemma types (IH×dilemma type: χ
2
[df = 1] = 5.12, OR 
= 1.28, p  =.024; IB×dilemma type: χ
2
[df = 1] = 8.30, OR = 1.37, p = .004). Specifically, 
instrumental harm beliefs better predicted judgments about traditional dilemmas (OR = 1.96, 
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partial rpb = .37) than about triage dilemmas (OR = 1.53, partial rpb = .22), z = -2.26, p = .024.  In 
turn, impartial beneficence beliefs predicted judgments about triage dilemmas (OR = 1.25, partial 
rpb = .10), but did not predict judgments of traditional dilemmas (OR = 0.91, partial rpb = -.05)—
and these coefficients statistically differed from each other, z = 2.88, p = .004.   
Second, utilitarian beliefs differentially predicted permissibility judgments across 
dilemma types (IH×dilemma type: χ
2
[df = 1] = 13.92, OR = 1.45, p < .001; IB×dilemma type: 
χ
2
[df = 1] = 3.00, OR = 0.84, p = .083). Instrumental harm beliefs better predicted judgments of 
permissibility in traditional dilemmas (OR = 1.74, partial r = .42) than in triage dilemmas (OR = 
1.17, partial r = .14)—and these effects statistically differed from each other, z = -5.68, p < .001. 
Meanwhile, impartial beneficence predicted permissibility judgments for triage dilemmas (OR = 
1.28, partial r = .14) thought not traditional dilemmas (OR = 1.08, partial r = .04); and the 
difference between these marginal trends approached significance, z = 1.73, p = .083.    
 Third, impartial beneficence independently predicted judgments of relative blame in 
triage dilemmas (B = -0.01, t = -2.22, p = .026, partial r = .07), even after controlling for the 
effect of instrumental harm beliefs (B = -0.02, t = -4.19, p < .001, partial r = .12). We did not 
include the blame dependent measures in Study 2, precluding the comparison across dilemma 
types. 
 Collectively, these results show that views about triage dilemmas depend upon both 
instrumental harm beliefs and impartial beneficence—whereas attitudes toward traditional 
dilemmas are shaped primarily (or even solely) by beliefs about instrumental harm.  
Ideological Disagreements on Triage Dilemmas 
The 12-item SECS scale discriminated between Democrats (M = 4.13, SD = 0.93), 
Republicans (M = 5.64, SD = 0.78) and Independents (M = 4.69, SD = 0.99), all pairwise ps < 
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.001. We observed clear associations between political ideology and general attitudes toward 
Covid-19: Conservatives were more likely to hold conspiratorial beliefs about Covid-19, r(1132) 
= .20, 95% CI [.14, .26], while liberals were more likely to treat Covid-19 as a serious threat, 
r(1130) = -.31, 95% CI [-.36, -.26], both ps < .001.  
Despite replicating ideological disagreements concerning the truth about Covid-19, we 
observed few moral disagreements between liberals and conservatives (see Table 4): No 
differences arose in either the Jeopardize or Reroute scenarios; meanwhile, in the Withdraw 
scenario, conservatives were more likely to blame the utilitarian agent than were liberals (see 
also Luke & Gawronski, 2021; Hannikainen, Miller & Cushman, 2017)—but no parallel 
differences emerged for permissibility or prescriptive judgments. Bayesian model comparisons 
confirmed that liberals and conservatives revealed robust disagreement concerning the truth 
about Covid-19 (BF10s > 10
11
), but tended to agree in their moral attitudes toward triage 
dilemmas (BF01s > 5; except regarding permissibility, which was inconclusive BF10 < 3). 
Table 4 
Ideological Differences in Moral Attitudes, Conspiratorial Thinking and Perceived Severity 
 Withdraw Jeopardize Redirect 
Main effect of 
SECS score 
(BF) 
Ns  386 309 433 1128 (pooled) 



















































Note. *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .005. null: in support of null model; alt.: in support of 
alternative model. Bold cells indicate significant correlations with SECS scores. 
Discussion  
First, we found limited effects of empathy, which could stem from the self-reported 
nature of our measures. Importantly, the effect of empathic concern—where present—reversed 
from traditional, trolley-type contexts to psychologically realistic, triage contexts: i.e., 
underlying deontological judgments in traditional dilemmas, but utilitarian judgments in triage 
dilemmas. 
Second, attitudes toward traditional dilemmas were linked to participants’ abstract 
attitudes toward instrumental harm (in line with Kahane et al., 2015 2018), whereas attitudes 
toward dilemmas involving critical care were also tied to participants’ tendency toward impartial 
beneficence. Thus, for psychologically realistic dilemmas, prosocial attitudes including affective 
empathy and impartial beneficence can also be predictors of greater utilitarian tendencies (in 
contrast to previous work on trolley-type dilemmas; see e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; 
Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). 
Third, we replicated the association between political ideology and beliefs about the 
origin and severity of Covid-19—revealing substantial polarization. Yet, in their moral attitudes 
toward critical care triage, liberals and conservatives appeared to be largely in agreement.  
General Discussion 
Our study documented heightened utilitarianism in diverse locations throughout the 
United States in reaction to dilemmas describing ICU triage scenarios. These attitudes appeared 
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not to depend on the prevalence of Covid-19 confirmed positives; but, rather, arose 
homogeneously across high and low prevalence regions (Study 1). We then reasoned that this 
effect could stem from a period effect, i.e., heightened utilitarianism following the onset of the 
Covid-19 pandemic—yet our evidence spoke against period-driven change in moral judgment 
(Study 2). Alternatively, the effect could be due to the psychological realism of critical care 
dilemmas. Our next follow-up (Study 3) lent support to this interpretation, demonstrating a 
selective tendency to favor utilitarian resolutions of triage dilemmas, relative to tightly-matched 
dilemmas unrelated to the Covid-19 pandemic.  
As such, our findings dovetail with prior evidence showing that promoting experimental 
realism amplifies—rather than dampens—utilitarian tendencies (Patil et al., 2014; Francis et al., 
2016, 2017, see also Baumann et al. 2012). This result cannot easily be explained by theories that 
link utilitarian tendencies to sub-clinical deficits in affect (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Our 
moderation analyses pointed toward a distinct explanation: First, affective engagement was 
linked to utilitarian responses in triage dilemmas (but deontological responses to traditional 
dilemmas). Thus, experimental realism could heighten utilitarian responses, by activating an 
approach motivation (i.e., the concern with saving lives), which is otherwise absent in traditional 
dilemma contexts. Adopting the two-dimensional model of utilitarianism provided convergent 
evidence: As in previous research (Kahane et al., 2015), when considering traditional sacrificial 
dilemmas, utilitarian responses depended primarily on the belief that instrumental harm is 
permissible. In contrast, utilitarian triage decisions were independently linked to both dimensions 
of utilitarianism: Beliefs about the permissibility of instrumental harm continued to predict 
utilitarian attitudes toward triage, but so did attitudes of impartial beneficence. 




Our study adds to growing concerns that the literature on trolley dilemmas has generated 
a series of misconceptions about moral cognition in general (Baumann et al. 2012), and 
utilitarian ethics in particular. First, predominant experimental paradigms may have downplayed 
the extent to which people endorse utilitarian outcomes in real life (see also Francis et al., 2017; 
Patil et al., 2014). Relatedly, existing work has associated utilitarian ethics to an antisocial 
personality (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), and yet our present studies demonstrate that utilitarian 
attitudes can also arise among prosocial individuals—at least when considering moral dilemmas 
that afford psychological and experimental realism. 
On a more promising note, our study reveals that—while the origin and severity of 
Covid-19 are a matter of profound political division—at least some ethical questions that arise 
for the allocation of public health resources are not. Liberals and conservatives appear to agree, 
in large part, on the morality of utilitarian resolutions to dilemmas arising in the context of 
critical care triage.  
Limitations and Future Research 
First, our studies recruited large samples in order to maximize statistical power to observe 
average-sized effects. As such, even very small individual differences (e.g., the effects of 
empathy and perspective-taking on moral attitudes) reached the threshold of statistical 
significance. However, statistical significance does not entail practical significance; so readers 
should exercise caution and consider both statistical significance and effect size to gauge the 
relevance of each of our findings.  
Second, although we obtained strong evidence that psychological realism exerts an 
influence on moral judgment, our studies provided limited insight into the mechanism inducing 
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this effect. Moderation analyses in Section 5 yielded tentative evidence that prosocial 
dispositions may explain people’s heightened utilitarianism in critical care dilemmas: 
Potentially, coronavirus patients elicit attitudes of impartial beneficence to a greater extent than 
do the nondescript victims of traditional moral dilemmas. However, confirmatory research is 
needed to establish the credibility of this particular explanation.  
Third, given rapid change in the circumstances surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic, we 
cannot confidently describe any constraints on the generality of our findings. Plausibly, as 
Covid-19 continues to ‘normalize’, its psychological salience—the very feature at the core of our 
findings—might dwindle. If so, a deeper understanding of the present phenomenon may require 
conceptual adaptations of the present methods to novel contexts. 
Fourth, our conclusions are based strictly on online convenience samples of US 
participants. Research comparing such samples to nationally representative samples underscores 
that, while demographic differences are pronounced, the results of social science studies 
generally replicate across sampling methods—with few exceptions (Chandler, Rosenzweig, 
Moss, Robinson, & Litman, 2019). Furthermore, studies of utilitarian sacrifice have documented 
a remarkable degree of universality (Awad et al., 2020). Relatedly, the present tendency toward 
heightened utilitarianism on triage dilemmas emerged also in a nationally representative sample 
(Wilkinson et al., 2020). 
Conclusion 
Moral psychologists have long debated whether, and under what conditions, people favor 
utilitarian approaches to the sacrifice of human lives for the greater good. The early stages of the 
Covid-19 pandemic provided a unique context to explore this issue in circumstances of 
unprecedented realism and practical relevance: What should frontline ICU professionals do when 
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faced with the decision whether to sacrifice one patient and save a larger number of lives? 
Despite flagrant political polarization surrounding the origin and severity of Covid-19, liberals 
and conservatives alike supported utilitarian approaches to the rationing of scarce medical 
resources during the pandemic. This result could not have easily been predicted by previous 
research on trolley-type sacrificial dilemmas, perhaps because these unrealistic scenarios fail to 
muster the same cognitive processes, such as impartial beneficence, that govern utilitarian 
reasoning about pressing, real-world issues. As a result, our evidence provides grounds for 
optimism about the multilateral development of public health guidelines to govern triage and 
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